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Foreword
This report describes a local initiative, Policing Diversity in Lambeth (PDL), which
was developed to address the challenges of policing a highly ethnically diverse
population.
The report is timely. The report of the Macpherson Inquiry into the death of
Stephen Lawrence has substantially redrawn the policy landscape in relation to
policing and race issues. The Home Secretary’s priorities for policing in 2000-1
emphasise the need for improved community relations. The follow-up report by 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Winning the Race Revisited’, further
stressed the need for urgent action. Parallel with these developments, the 1998
Crime and Disorder Act imposed a duty on police and local authorities to work to
reduce crime in partnerships with local communities, and to engage more fully in
consultation with local communities.
The report provides a snapshot of PDL at a particular stage in its development, and
this report may seem of historical interest only. However, the analysis of underlying
relations between the police and the community will have wider applicability for
both the police and crime and disorder partnerships, as do the lessons that can be
drawn from PDL’s first year.
Ken Pease
Acting Head of Policing and Reducing Crime Unit
Research, Development and Statistics Directorate
Home Office
January 2000
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Executive Summary
This study was carried out in 1998 as a preliminary evaluation of the Policing
Diversity in Lambeth (PDL) strategy. This strategy was a local initiative in one
London borough, addressing the challenges of policing a highly ethnically diverse
population. This report analyses the problems the strategy was designed to tackle,
and assesses the quality of the strategy and the extent to which the objectives of
PDL’s Year One Action Plan had been achieved or were being successfully
implemented by mid-1998. The study was based on interviews with police officers,
members of the Lambeth Community-Police Consultative Group (C-PCG) and
members of the general public. It also draws on a number of police and public
documents. 
When the report was in draft stage, it became clear that the report of the
Macpherson Inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence would substantially 
redraw the policy landscape in relation to policing and race issues. Since then a
great deal of change has taken place within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)
over a short period of time. Within Lambeth, PDL is now focusing on a Year Two
Action Plan which takes account of the successes and failures of the first year; and
there have been other related initiatives. In a sense, therefore, this report may now
seem of historical interest only. Clearly its assessment of the strategy is now out-of-
date, providing a snapshot of the PDL strategy at a particular stage in its
development. However, our analysis of the underlying dynamics of relations 
between the police and the local community may have wider applicability, as may
the lessons that can be drawn from PDL’s first year.
Key points to emerge on police/community relations in Lambeth
● Police/community relations in the borough had undoubtedly improved over the
last fifteen years.
● Public confidence in the police in Lambeth was significantly below the average
for the Metropolitan Police in the late 1990s.
● This largely reflects the poor ratings of the police given by black people. 
● In general black people’s low levels of confidence in the police arose from a 
sense of being over-policed as crime suspects, and under-protected as crime
victims.
● Stop-and-search, CS spray, deaths in custody and the investigation of racially
motivated crimes were all specific sources of concern. 
● Police morale was not high; many officers felt that the community failed to
recognise the value of their work and the difficult circumstances in which they
operated.
● Police officers tended to think that community concerns were overstated and
based on rumour, anecdote and misunderstanding.
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● They thought that stop-and-search tactics were an essential part of their crime-
fighting armoury.
● Some police officers felt under intense pressure to achieve statistical targets,
which skewed their work towards strategies to yield arrests. 
● Probably the most important point to stress is that both the police and their
critics had considerable difficulty in appreciating the viewpoints of each other.
An assessment of PDL’s first year
● Implementation of the strategy had been subject to some slippage.
● This had damaged relations between the C-PCG and the police; some C-PCG
members saw the slippage as a sign of a reduction in police commitment to the
strategy.
● Some of the strategy’s Year One objectives had been met, but others had not.
● In particular, rank-and-file police awareness of PDL was low, and community
awareness very limited indeed.
● The C-PCG had played a key part in initiating PDL, but the effectiveness of the
group in promoting the strategy was limited and constrained by in-fighting
between individuals in different organisations.
This stock-taking exercise has exposed some of the pitfalls which threaten any
attempt to improve relations between police and the community. First, and
unsurprisingly, progress is often slow – slower than key participants would wish.
Second, the natural impatience to see progress puts pressure particularly on police
participants to take an optimistic view of what can be achieved within short time-
frames: people are tempted to offer hostages to fortune in such circumstances.
Thirdly, optimistic plans can very readily be derailed by unexpected factors,
including new legislative demands and new management priorities. Finally, if and
when this occurs, a dynamic is triggered in which previously established trust is
rapidly eroded. Even the most adept of communicators may find it difficult to
retrieve such a situation.
Strengths and weaknesses of the strategy 
As reflected in its Year One Action Plan, the strategy had several strong points.
First, it promoted the development of a broad spectrum of community contacts.
Second, it placed substantial priority on Community and Race Relations (CRR)
training as a mechanism for educating police officers on community race relations.
Third, it promoted the recruitment and support of ethnic minorities in the police
force. Fourth, PDL objectives were incorporated into policing plans and the staff
appraisal process. Finally, the importance of improving links and relations with 
youth in the community was made evident by the commitment in the strategy to
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engage in a number of efforts involving youth and schools. Each of these
components are valuable parts of the process of bringing the police closer to
delivering a service that is fair and equitable and seen to be so. The strategy should
thus be viewed as a good starting point, for it initiated a process focused upon CRR
issues and developed some mechanisms for improving the way the police service
interacts with the public. 
However, in the state of development that it had reached in mid-1998, several
aspects of the strategy needed addressing:
● Organisational “sticks and carrots” were probably needed as much as other
initiatives such as training programmes to ensure that PDL principles become
embedded in everyday practice.
● Without such sticks and carrots, day-to -day pressures and demands of police
work would continue to shape the nature and style of policing.
● There was a clear need for a better developed communications strategy within
PDL. This needed to cover both internal and external communication – to
ensure that all police officers were fully aware of the strategy, on the one hand,
and to reach the wider public on the other.
● To be effective, the internal communication strategy needed to stress that
pursuing PDL is in officers’ own interests. There were two main possible “selling
points”: the first was that achieving PDL objectives would make their job easier,
safer and more rewarding; the second was that doing so would unlock
organisational rewards (or ward off organisational punishments).
● The C-PCG clearly had an important role to play in communicating the PDL
strategy and its achievements to the wider community. C-PCG members were
better placed than the police to convey to some sectors of the community the
nature and objectives of PDL.
● Little progress had been made in implementing the recruitment elements of the
PDL strategy. There was a need for sustained long-term action both at force level
and at OCU/borough level.
● Stop-and-search was one of the major sources of public concern and real
improvement in this area would do much to improve relations between the 
police and the public. 
Recommendations
When this study was completed in mid-1998, we offered police managers in
Lambeth a series of recommendations about the development of PDL. For the
purposes of this report, we have translated the recommendations into general
principles which we think will apply to any CRR strategy designed to improve
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relations between the police and the public. These recommendations are intended 
to be consistent with those contained in “Winning the Race” and “ Winning the
Race Revisited”, the reports of two thematic inspections by Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Constabulary on police community and race relations (HMIC, 1997,
1999).
● CRR strategies must be firmly embedded within police forces’ organisational
reward system, with a comprehensive mix of “sticks and carrots” designed to
ensure that officers take the strategy seriously.
● CRR training is of obvious value, but cannot be relied upon as the only or 
primary means of changing officers’ behaviour and beliefs. Equating CRR 
strategies solely with CRR training is a recipe for failure.
● CRR strategies need a well-designed internal communications plan. Such
strategies will need “selling” to officers on the ground. The payoffs in terms of
effectiveness, safety and organisational rewards will need spelling out.
● To aid internal communication, local senior managers need to signal loudly and
clearly to their workforce that they attach importance to the CRR strategy.
● CRR strategies need comprehensive plans for external communication. It is
essential to get across to the community the nature of crime problems, and the
ways in which the police and their partners are tackling crime. 
● The police themselves may lack sufficient credibility to get the message across to
those who most need to hear it. “Allies” may be needed, such as the C-PCG in
Lambeth, who can command more trust in relevant sectors of the community.
● Local crime reduction partnerships established by the Crime and Disorder Act
1998 need to be fully involved in CRR strategies. 
● The impact of formal and informal performance indicators needs to be carefully
assessed, to ensure that they do not distort policing practice in ways which
damage community relations. This is especially important in relation to stop-
and-search practice.
● CRR strategies should place emphasis on the early identification of sources of
concern within the community about policing practice; sources of concern need
to be acknowledged and debated openly by the police. 
● CRR strategies need to find ways of educating and training people – and
especially youths – from ethnic minority groups about policing practice and ways
of interacting successfully with the police.
● CRR strategies need to foster a more explicit debate about appropriate levels of
stop-and-search and about acceptable “hit rates” in terms of arrests. 
● Where special operations involving high rates of stop-and-search (or other such
tactics) are used, there needs to be closer consultation with local permanent beat
officers and, where appropriate, members of the public.
● CRR strategies need to assess fully the scope for effective local action to 
stimulate ethnic minority recruitment.
(viii)
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1. Introduction
This report started life as a preliminary evaluation of the Policing Diversity in
Lambeth (PDL) strategy. The strategy is a local initiative in one London borough,
addressing the challenges of policing a highly ethnically diverse population. It can 
be seen as an attempt to break the cycle of mutual distrust which has characterised
police/community relations in Lambeth and many other inner city areas with large
ethnic minority populations. It was designed to be broad-based; its aim was to 
infuse all aspects of policing with greater sensitivity to Community and Race
Relations (CRR) issues. The Year One Action Plan included staff training,
improvements in internal and external communications, plans to incorporate CRR
issues into staff appraisal and integration of the strategy into the Borough Policing
Plan. 
The evaluation was carried out in mid-1998, at the end of the first year of the PDL
strategy. It aimed to analyse the problems the strategy was designed to tackle, to
determine the quality of the strategy, and the extent to which the objectives of 
PDL’s Year One Action Plan had been achieved or were being successfully
implemented. 
When the report was in draft stage, it became clear that the report of the
Macpherson Inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence (Macpherson, 1999) 
would substantially redraw the policy landscape in relation to policing and race
issues. There have been other developments in Lambeth, many of them related. For
example, building on earlier work on stop-and-search (MPS, 1998), the
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has launched an initiative in Brixton and six
other areas designed to improve police practice and public understanding in 
relation to stop-and-search (FitzGerald, 1999). This work on searches stemmed 
from a recognition that the disproportionate search rates for some minority groups
could not be wholly “explained away”. Community Safety Units have been set up in
all three Lambeth police divisions. The PDL strategy itself has been revised and
developed; and the programme of community and race relations training which 
was just starting in early 1998 has now covered all police officers in Lambeth. 
In a sense, therefore, this report may now seem of historical interest only. It 
provides a snapshot of the PDL strategy at a particular stage in its development.
Clearly its assessment of the strategy is now out-of-date; PDL is now focusing on a
Year Two Action Plan, which takes account of the successes and failures of the first
year.
However, our analysis of the underlying dynamics of relations between the police
and the community may have wider applicability, as do the lessons that can be
drawn from PDL’s first year. The Home Secretary has set a Ministerial Priority of
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“improving trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic 
communities”. We hope that this analysis will be of some value to police forces
struggling to improve on the patchy state of affairs revealed in “Winning the Race”
and “Winning the Race Revisited”, the reports of two linked thematic inspections 
by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC, 1997, 1999). Though
substantively unchanged, the present report has been revised to take into account
the publication of the Macpherson Report and its aftermath, and to provide a
broader context in which to locate the development of PDL.
Lambeth is an inner London borough with a population of a quarter of a million. It
is policed as three divisions of the MPS. In thinking about policing in Lambeth, it is
easy to adopt various stereotypical misconceptions. It is certainly a poor borough,
but there are other inner city areas such as Southwark, Tower Hamlets and 
Hackney which score higher on indices of deprivation. Parts of the borough are
affluent, and bear the signs of many years of gentrification. Whilst its recorded 
crime rates are high - especially for burglary and robbery - there are several other
boroughs with similar rates, including Westminster, Camden, Southwark and
Hackney. Lambeth has the largest black population in London, with 13% 
describing themselves in the 1991 Census as Black Caribbean, 7% as Black African
and 3% as “Black Other”. However, the white population stood at 70% in 1991 -
more than Brent at 55% or Hackney at 66%.
Lambeth occupies a special, if unhappy, place in the history of police/community
relations. In the summer of 1981, rioting erupted in a number of British cities; the
ones in Brixton were some of the worst seen in twentieth century Britain. There
were two further distinguishing features, however: a large proportion of those
involved in the disturbances of the early 1980s were black; and the main object of
their action was the police. The events both in Brixton and elsewhere could be 
seen as the culmination of deteriorating relations between the police and local
ethnic minority communities. 
The 1981 disturbances led to an enquiry by Lord Scarman, whose report was
published in the same year (Scarman, 1981). Its main conclusions focused on the
need for styles of policing which were more responsive and sensitive to local needs,
and it contained a great many recommendations, including the establishment of
better consultative machinery, in the shape of community/police consultative
groups. These were set up under Section 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence
Act 1984; they now derive their statutory authority from the Police Act 1996, 
which requires the police authority to consult on priorities, the local policing plan
and the prevention of crime (Section 96, Police Act 1996).
INTRODUCTION
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The Lambeth Community-Police Consultative Group (C-PCG) has been one of 
the more active of these, and has some notable achievements to its credit. Over the
years following Lord Scarman’s report, a great deal was done to mend fences
between the police and the public, both across London and more specifically in
Lambeth. 
While progress has continued, relations between the police and various segments of
the community in Lambeth remained quite seriously strained at the time of
fieldwork. Many of the sources of public disquiet were recognisably those which
triggered the 1981 disturbances: a sense that policing strategies are discriminatory,
especially in relation to the targeting of stop-and-search. A further focus of concern
was deaths in police custody.
A final factor was a belief that minorities got sub-standard treatment from the 
police as victims of crime. Whilst such beliefs may have been partly grounded in
direct experience, attitudes will also have been shaped by a number of high profile
murders which clearly or very probably had racist motives. The problem posed for
police/community relations was not that these murders were racially motivated, but
that the police response to some of them was judged inadequate. The most visible
case was that of Stephen Lawrence, who was killed by a gang of five white youths 
in Eltham in 1993.1 The Government asked Lord Macpherson in 1997 to carry out 
a Public Inquiry into the aftermath of the murder. His final report (Macpherson,
1999), published after fieldwork for this study was carried out, contained strong
criticisms of the police. It concluded that the investigation into the murder was
marred by a combination of professional incompetence, leadership failure and
institutional racism. 
Stephen Lawrence was murdered not in Lambeth but in the nearby borough of
Greenwich. However, there can be no doubt that five years’ worth of media
coverage of the case will have had a corrosive impact on police/community 
relations in Lambeth. In crude numerical terms racist murders of this nature are
rare. However people inevitably generalise from the particular, leading to a
widespread sense that black victims of crime can expect second-class justice. 
Until recently the legitimacy of these community concerns was contested ground.
Whilst it was agreed that minorities were disproportionately subjected to stop-and-
search procedures, there were disagreements over whether this could be explained
by disproportionate involvement in offending. Some senior officers also rejected
suggestions of institutional racism within the MPS. The Macpherson Report has
effectively foreclosed the arguments. It argued that the police and other public
authorities needed to take a more active role in challenging racism. Coupled with
the Ministerial Priority to improve ethnic minorities’ confidence in the police and
INTRODUCTION
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1 The murder of Michael Menson
and suspected murder of Ricky
Reel have also attracted a great
deal of media attention, but there
are at least a further ten widely
reported cases in London since
1990 where racial motivation was
established or strongly suspected.
the HMIC CRR thematic inspection, the report has placed overwhelming pressure
on the Metropolitan Police – and other forces – to ensure that credible and 
effective CRR strategies are in place at both force and OCU level.
Another source of pressure to improve police/community relations comes from the
Crime and Disorder Act 1998. This legislation includes provisions which 
restructure police relationships with statutory bodies on the one hand, and with the
broader community on the other. The police are required to develop a crime
reduction strategy in partnership with the local authority, probation and health
services. The Act places great emphasis on the need for this strategy to be
responsive to local public views. Moreover, the Government has accepted
Recommendation 70 of the Macpherson Report, which proposes that the crime
reduction strategies should, where appropriate, include initiatives to promote
cultural diversity and address racism. To meet the new statutory duties, therefore,
there has to be a culture of openness and trust between the police, other agencies
and the wider community.2
Research methods
This effort was a small-scale, exploratory study, with fieldwork conducted over a
four-week period in May/June 1998. Only a small number of interviews could be
carried out in the time available. Thus, the findings presented here must be seen as
provisional, though the consistency and clarity of the picture that emerges gives us
considerable confidence in our conclusions.
The principal researcher carried out a number of interviews with police officers and
local community members. He interviewed fourteen police officers, including eight
PCs, two Detective Constables, three Sergeants, and one Detective Inspector. He
also attended a CRR training session in which twelve police sergeants participated,
together with nine youths from the local community. Many views from both groups
were gathered on this occasion. A number of police documents were reviewed,
including current and past local and MPS-wide policing plans and police surveys of
public opinion.
Six members of the Lambeth C-PCG were interviewed, as well as one senior 
council official. These respondents had a wide range of local associations with
community organisations. Information from members of the public was gathered
through formal interviews with 14 local residents who ranged widely in age and 
who were not involved in active local community groups. Given the limited time
available for the research, we focused mainly on Brixton Division, which covers
roughly a third of the borough. We cannot say to what extent attitudes and the
experiences of police officers and residents in the other two Lambeth divisions
INTRODUCTION
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2 See the Home Office guidance
to Sections 5 & 6 of the Act
(Hough and Tilley, 1998). 
would be similar. Nor - given the small scale of the study - can we assess with any
certainty to what extent we have captured representative views of the police and 
the public within Brixton division. 
All fieldwork was carried out by the principal researcher, an American. It proved to
be to the study’s advantage to have a researcher whose status as an “outsider”
allowed for the posing of awkward questions. Our judgement is that this allowed
respondents to be more open and honest with their responses. 
The structure of this report
This study not only aimed to evaluate the implementation and effectiveness of the
PDL strategy but also tried to help all those involved in the process to discover 
how they could adjust the strategy to make it more effective and successful. Section
2 offers an analysis of police/community relations in the area. It does not aim to
offer a quantified description – though it borrows from previous survey work. Its
main aim is to characterise the main features of the mutual distrust which exists 
and to consider how it might have developed. Section 3 describes the origins and
content of the strategy originally devised to address some of the problems 
associated with this, and the extent to which the objectives of the strategy had 
been achieved at the end of the first year. Section 4 offers some conclusions and
recommendations. The final section serves as an epilogue, summarising how PDL
and related initiatives have developed in the eighteen months since fieldwork was
completed.
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2.  Police/community relations in Lambeth: a snapshot 
in 1998
In discussing a topic as sensitive as relations between the police and minority 
ethnic groups, the first thing to stress is that things have got better in Lambeth 
since the 1981 disturbances. There was unanimity amongst the members of the 
C-PCG whom we interviewed, and amongst prominent members of ethnic
minorities, that relations between the police and ethnic minority communities had
significantly improved over the past 15 years. They felt that the quality of dialogue
and exchange between the two groups had improved, with greater mutual respect
and less defensiveness on the part of senior police. They also thought that the 
police were more actively involved in the community and were having greater
success in tackling crime:
“Overall they do a good job; it’s a tough environment to police.”
“In the past there was a barrier between police and youth; a good deal of
hostility. Now, they are in the schools, they come into the youth club.”
Nevertheless, while progress should be acknowledged, police/community relations 
in Lambeth remained poor by comparison with other areas in London. A MORI
survey conducted for the MPS in 1997 found that ratings of the police in Brixton
Division were substantially lower than the MPS average. For example, 31% of
Brixton residents thought that the police had a good understanding of the local
community, as against 48% across London; 23% said that the police had a lot of
respect, as against 48% across London.
The first step in explaining these findings is to examine which groups had least
confidence in the police. An NOP survey carried out for the MPS across the
borough of Lambeth in early 1998 showed very clearly that the views of black 
people were less favourable than those of white people and of other ethnic groups.
32% of black respondents thought the police did a good job in the area, compared
with 53% of white respondents and 51% of Asians. Our research, whilst small-
scale, can go some way to identifying the factors which contributed to low police
ratings. 
Public concerns about policing in Lambeth
Those members of the C-PCG whom we interviewed identified several concerns
about local policing, which they regarded as being widespread across the black
community. Overall they felt that the young, the poor, and ethnic minorities saw
themselves predominately as being policed, not as clients of police services. 
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They thought that:
● black people were over-represented as victims of crime;
● they did not receive sufficient attention as victims of crime;
● police behaviour towards minority groups was guided by negative stereotypes, so
that
● they received excessive attention as crime suspects.
These negative attitudes among the general public were regarded by C-PCG
respondents as deeply held and surprisingly resilient in the face of objectively
improving circumstances. The strength with which these views can be held was
exemplified by one community respondent who remarked, “I have total distrust of the
police.” A C-PCG respondent explained such feelings by pointing out that the
memory and history of the disturbances had been quite enduring and continued to
colour public perspectives towards the police. There were several more specific
concerns.
Stop-and-search
While C-PCG respondents appreciated the importance and legitimacy of the police
power to stop and search, they identified this as a central source of friction between
the police and the community. The concerns were that black people were
disproportionately picked up, too many innocent people were stopped, and the
treatment that minorities received during stops was sometimes objectionable.
There can be little doubt that black people were and still are disproportionately
subject to stop-and-search. Nationally, stop-and-search rates are five times higher
for black people than white; within London both black and white people are 
stopped at much higher rates, but the ratio of one to five is preserved (Home 
Office, 1998). The London stop-and-search rate in 1997/98 for black people of 181
per 1,000 population was the highest in the country, roughly five times higher than
the London rate, and ten times higher than the national rate, for white people. 
The figures are complex to interpret (cf MPS, 1998; FitzGerald, 1999); in particular
comparisons between the MPS and other areas may be misleading (FitzGerald and
Hale, forthcoming). But it is hard to avoid the conclusion that some element, at
least, of institutional racism has been embedded in MPS stop-and-search practice.
An MPS/NOP survey found more scepticism in Brixton about police use of stop-
and-search than in four other London areas. 68% of respondents in Brixton felt 
that the police in practice stop and search anyone they like; corresponding figures 
for other areas were: Tottenham – 54%, Hounslow – 40%, Plumstead – 47%, and
Kingston – 37%.3
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3 Samples were small (between
113 and 144 per site) but
differences of this order are
statistically significant.
Our respondents made reference to the low number of arrests that result from stops
as evidence that most of those who are stopped have committed no offence.4 Some
suggested that the police use the tactic to harass black youths and then come up
with flimsy reasoning to support their actions; “When no drugs found, police seek
something else.” Others looked to ignorance as opposed to dubious intentions as an
explanation: as one said, “Police make many mistakes and nick the wrong guy; police
can’t distinguish between many of the Blacks.” 
It was also put to us that during these stops, police treated suspects disrespectfully
and verbally abused them. The problem was seen in terms of youths failing to offer
sufficient deference, prompting the police to reassert their authority. It was thought
that in some cases, police disrespect – or perceived disrespect – towards suspects
prompted negative reactions which resulted in the situations spiralling out of
control. Again, the MPS/NOP survey of Lambeth residents echoes these concerns:
29% of black respondents compared to 14% of white people and 19% of Asians
thought that the police are very or fairly impolite when speaking to people from
ethnic minorities.
A final concern was that much stopping activity does not get recorded. One
respondent explained, “Stops only don’t get recorded, just stop and search. This is a big
issue. There is a dark figure here. No explanation is given [in unrecorded stops].”5
CS spray
The possession and use of CS spray by police officers was a source of much public
concern. The anxiety was that CS spray had been – and would continue to be –
used disproportionately against black people and against black youths in particular.
Respondents cited concerns about health risks, and felt that it was premature to use
the device until more conclusive tests regarding its safety had been conducted. 
Deaths in custody
Some of those we interviewed expressed continuing concern over deaths in 
custody. There was a history of concern in the borough, relating most specifically to
deaths occurring in the mid-1990s. Though no deaths had occurred recently in the
borough, they felt that the risk remained significant in the absence of tighter
controls. The 1997 MPS public attitude survey reveals that public concern over the
treatment of people in custody continued to be a significant source of mistrust of 
the police.
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5 One of the Macpherson Report’s
recommendations was that all
stops should be recorded; the
present legislation requires a record
to be made only of those involving
searches.
4 Across London, the arrest rates
for black and white suspects in
1997 were 12% and 11%
respectively; roughly in line with
other forces; however, the higher
rate of stop-and-search in the
MPS means that 10% of all
arrests in London are derived from
these, compared with 5%
nationally (Home Office, 1998).
FitzGerald (1999) presents arrest
rates for Brixton Division in 1998
and 1999 of 13% and 18%
respectively, with  little difference
between ethnic groups.
Poor police handling of racially motivated crimes
At the time of our research, the Macpherson Inquiry was in progress, receiving a
great deal of media attention. The Menson case was also beginning to receive
attention. According to the 1998 MPS/NOP survey in Lambeth, only 16% of black
respondents thought the police did a good job in dealing with racially motivated
crime, compared with 29% of white people and 34% of Asians.6 Our respondents
identified perceptions of the policing of racially motivated crime as a highly
significant factor behind dissatisfaction amongst minority groups.
Direct or indirect experience? 
Our community respondents thought that these concerns came less from personal
experience and more from learning of the experiences of others. Media, parental,
and peer influences are all likely to play a part in the process by which negative
views about the police are sustained. When asked about the source of their
concerns, a common response was that it happened to a friend, they heard about it
from someone, or they learned of this through the media. (Police officers were
sensitive to this, and recognised the potential impact of a single cause célèbre both
within an individual police force, and across the country. In the words of one 
officer, “One bad incident can have big ramifications.”)
Police consultation with the public
Community respondents were heavily critical of the style with which the police
communicated to, and consulted with, the public. As one C-PCG respondent said,
“The police don’t have open arms and aren’t very willing to talk.” One local resident
clearly expressed more specific concerns:
“The police don’t truly consult with local people, people on the estates. 
They mount operations in their area without consulting and as a result, 
may undermine arrangements or plans locals had for handling things. 
There are consequences of police actions that they are insensitive to 
because they don’t engage locals on how to police the area.”
Some felt that the police acted first and informed the public after the event, as
opposed to truly involving local people in shaping decisions about the policing of
their areas. It is obviously not simple to resolve the tensions between community
pressure for more openness and the operational requirements not to reveal tactics 
in advance. 
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6 Asians are the group most at risk
of racial victimisation, according
to the British Crime Survey
(Percy, 1998).
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It was suggested that if more imaginative ways of working with people were
developed, the police could better engage the public in consultative processes and
engender much more public confidence and support. In the words of one
respondent, “Community relations is reduced to PR and needs to be more. . .there’s a
need for new and imaginative ways to consult.” The recent Youth Conference held in
Lambeth was put forth as an example of a creative way to get young people 
involved in sharing their perspectives and concerns regarding an array of local
issues. Getting local people involved in a process to improve police/community
relations was also bedevilled by the problems of all “grass roots politics”. As one
respondent put it, “Most folk don’t want to spend an evening in the Town Hall.”
The police also came in for some criticism for the way in which they managed
partnerships with other agencies and community groups. One respondent suggested
that the police tended to alienate their professional partners by acting unilaterally.
It was felt that more energy needed to be put into partnership, since other agencies
were sometimes better placed than the police to take effective action.
Many respondents – including police officers – said that the typically very short
periods of tenure for senior police managers created problems both in establishing a
dialogue with the community and in managing inter-agency partnerships. With so
much of progress in community relations relying on personalities, the brief tenure 
of OCU commanders was seen to undermine efforts to effect change in police
practices and build understandings between the community and the police.
Views from the police
Our account of community perspectives on policing will come as no surprise to
anyone familiar with police work in, and criminological research about, high crime
areas with ethnically diverse populations. The corresponding views from rank-and-
file police are less often heard. The overwhelming impression we had was of a
workforce that felt beleaguered and demoralised by issues to do with race and 
crime. Several expressed the view that they were doing a demanding job under
difficult circumstances and were getting little thanks for this from the community.
Respondents generally described police morale as middling or low. The frustration
arising from the lack of public support, appreciation, and co-operation was cited as 
a major contributing factor to low morale. The most extreme case was an officer
who said, “Morale is rock bottom. . . I don’t want to be a police officer any more.”
Another PC’s rather measured response was probably more representative: “The
community’s attitude moderates our enthusiasm.”
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This sense of grievance stemmed from a belief that local people failed to appreciate
the realities of crime and policing. They tended to regard police suspects first and
foremost as potential victims of police mistreatment; they rarely confronted the fact
– so it was thought – that suspects may have inflicted considerable suffering on 
their victims. The argument was that police were as much the subject of
stereotyping as those whom they policed. One officer related that while he had
pursued suspects, people had obstructed him, surrounded officers, threatened them,
and pulled suspects away to protect them. As he put it, people jumped to
conclusions too quickly: “They don’t even know; this guy could have just attacked your
daughter.”
Some officers expressed the view that the local community had to face up to
responsibilities of its own: 
“They need to put their own house in order before throwing stones. . . 
need to be more positive and take a stand against crime.”
“. . . local population need to turn around and alienate the criminal element
in their community.”
“They don’t ever own up to the wrongness of violence and drugs and the
difficulty of the police job.”
Many officers appreciated that there may be variations between ethnic groups in
styles of social interaction and that it was important to be sensitive to these.
However, their grasp of these variations was often limited, and in our view it was
this, rather than overt racism, that seemed to lead officers to be oblivious to the
presence or significance of relevant differences. Some adopted a “colour-blind”
stance, saying that issues of ethnic diversity affected their work only when there 
was a language difference. One officer in particular made this very clear: “We all
speak the same language so there’s not a problem. . . there’s no communication problem in
Brixton.” Another stated that “it doesn’t affect our job; it makes no difference. . . the law
is the law.” Similar sentiment is reflected by the officer who stated, “Police don’t 
deny anyone their identity; but they do have to obey the law.”
This tendency to underplay race issues often co-existed with a fairly narrow “crime
fighting” definition of the police role, and an “ends justifies the means” 
pragmatism. Several officers explained that they knew who the criminals were and
would use “any means necessary” to get them. The implication was that procedural
corners would be cut if this would catch the criminal. One PC explained his
personal approach to stop and search as follows: “It’s a means to an end. . . it is
technically misuse but practically necessary to get to the heart of the matter.” 
Some police respondents thought that there was some validity to the concerns
expressed by members of the public about police behaviour. They expressed the 
view that there was a modicum of police misbehaviour demanding investigation, 
and that these relatively rare incidents contributed to the public’s concern and
distrust. However the majority of interviewed officers tended to see public concern
over police practice largely as a function of misunderstanding and an over-reliance
on anecdotal evidence. They thought that people tended to generalise from a small
number of well-publicised incidents of malpractice when assessing general standards
of policing. For example:
“Anecdotes and myth contribute to negative attitudes.”
“These people will only see the negative things.”
“It all comes down to lack of understanding of what we have to do and 
how we do it.”
“I’m not naïve enough to believe there aren’t bad cops, but we’re not all 
the same.”
Most officers felt that they and their colleagues dealt fairly with people: “I believe in
treating people the same”; “Most [officers] do their job fairly and correctly. . . it’s not fair
to beat us over the head.” Several adopted a more qualified position: “Their [the
public’s] worries aren’t valid but I can see why they feel the way they do”; and, “People 
are legitimately concerned but not objectively justified in their concerns.”
Police views on stop-and-search
The power to stop and search7 was universally thought to be an important one. All
except four respondents recognised the risk of the power being misused, and most
said they were aware of misuse and abuse. They were well aware of the legal
requirements as set out by PACE, but stressed how subjective the process often was.
For example: 
“You must have reasonable grounds. Most officers adhere to this. 
However, an officer can ‘create’ reasonable grounds.”
“Plainclothes officers came in and searched the wrong person. . . officers
don’t have the necessary information to properly discern whom they should
and should not search.”
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7 Section 1 of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1994
empowers constables to "detain in
order to search any person.... in
any place to which the public has
access, if he or she has reasonable
grounds for suspecting that stolen
or prohibited articles will be
found."
“Abuse has not been totally eradicated... it’s very subjective; often grounds
are weak.”
“PACE formalises police’s sixth sense. . . However, when officers misuse 
the power, they try to explain and create a justification on the form; you
can’t write ‘hunch’ or ‘sixth sense’ on the form.”
“Many officers don’t follow protocol to the letter of the law.”
Asked why black people were disproportionately stopped, officers said that was
because black youths were disproportionately involved in the crimes targeted by
stop-and-search tactics – street robbery and drug offences. Many said that tactics
were intelligence-led, and that information about the identity – or at least 
ethnicity – of suspects justified the differential stop rates. Respondents tended to
view the low arrest rates for stop-and-search as a function of suspects’ skills in
defeating searches (e.g. swallowing drugs or hiding them in body cavities). 
Several officers believed that patrol officer performance was assessed against rates of
stops and arrests. They thought that the array of MPS and Home Office
performance indicators pressured officers to secure arrests regardless of the longer-
term costs in so doing. They regarded their managers as preoccupied with statistical
targets; one officer vehemently suggested that “all the Home Office care about is what
figures we give them.” Another said, “Management looks at arrest record. . . There is
pressure to make arrests; that’s what we’re supposed to do.” He went on to say that this
is done to motivate officers to go out and do their job, but that “this pressure can 
steer the odd individual to make arrests at any cost.” A sergeant suggested that 
reducing such pressure was an essential ingredient for improvement in this area,
saying, “we have to remove pressure from young PCs to go out and collect figures.”
CS spray
When asked about CS spray and public concerns about it, most officers said that it
was an important tool for officer safety. Several were aware that the public
questioned its use. However they thought that this was due to their lack of
understanding of the importance of CS spray and how it is actually used in 
practice: “The public don’t understand the job police have to do and the importance of CS
spray.” The minority who saw some legitimacy in the public’s concerns thought 
that in the eyes of the public the police use of CS spray represented a departure
from the tradition of an unarmed police force.
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Some officers who valued CS spray’s protective value further intimated that they
would use it if necessary, meaning if the situation at hand warranted its use. One 
PC stated, “You can’t govern use on the street. . . it’s the ‘human factor’; guidelines 
won’t help.” Another said that “police throughout the Met would use it [CS spray] if
necessary.” This point, that situational factors determine officer behaviour, was 
made by officers with reference to other police tactics as well, and will be an
important consideration as this report looks at the ability of policy to impact police
actions on the ground.
Chapter summary
The following are the key points to emerge from this brief review of
police/community relations in Lambeth in 1998:
● Police/community relations in the borough had undoubtedly improved over the
last fifteen years.
● Public confidence in the police in Lambeth was significantly below the average
for the Metropolitan Police.
● This largely reflected the poor ratings of the police given by the black 
community.
● In general the black community’s low levels of confidence in the police arose
from a sense of being over-policed as crime suspects, and under-protected as
crime victims.
● Stop-and-search, CS spray, deaths in custody and the investigation of racially
motivated crimes were all specific sources of concern. 
● Police morale was not high, and many officers felt that the community failed to
recognise the value of their work, and the difficult circumstances in which they
operated.
● Police officers tended to think that community concerns were overstated, and
based on rumour, anecdote and misunderstanding.
● They thought that stop-and-search tactics were an essential part of their crime-
fighting armoury.
● Some police officers felt under intense pressure to achieve statistical targets,
which skewed their work towards strategies to yield arrests.
Probably the most important point to stress is that both the police and their critics
had considerable difficulty in appreciating the viewpoints of each other. We have
attempted to illustrate the contrasting viewpoints in Table 1 by drawing on
comments made by police and community participants in the CRR training session
in which the principal researcher participated. 
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This inability to understand alternative viewpoints is most clearly illustrated by the
issues surrounding stop-and-search. The police perspective emphasised the crime
control benefits of stop-and-search, and down-played the costs in terms of public
dissatisfaction and sense of grievance. Those groups in the community which
attracted the highest rates of stop-and-search not surprisingly took the opposite
view. Both “sides” were able to marshal statistical evidence – often the same
statistics – to support their position to some extent. Whilst the facts are important,
what is really at issue is the right balance to strike between short-term crime 
control objectives and long-term objectives of consolidating confidence in the
police. We shall return to this issue in the final chapter.
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Table 1: Community versus police perspectives
CS spray
Disproportionate use of
stop-and-search
Police stereotyping of black
people
Treatment during a stop
Deaths in custody
“Lots of blacks have died
from CS spray.”
“Police are targeting more
young black men.”
“If a black has a flash car,
police think he’s a drug
dealer.”
“It’s the way you’re stopped
that upsets us.”
“I think there’s been an
increase in the number of
deaths in custody.”
“We need to protect
ourselves.”
“They’re stopping the blacks
because the blacks are
committing the robberies.”
“Stereotyping helps us to
categorise people; it helps us
eliminate suspects.”
“How they react to us
determines how we react to
them.”
“Do you know about the lay
visitors’ scheme? . . . It
[police station] is quite an
open place.”
Community Police
3.  The PDL strategy
The PDL strategy had its origins in the mid-1990s, with a growing sense both 
within C-PCG and amongst senior police managers that improving
police/community relations had to be a priority in Lambeth. The strategy was
developed collaboratively by the C-PCG and the police, with the police Borough
Liaison Office taking on a significant co-ordination and development role. It was
originally presented in February 1997 as “The Lambeth Police Joint Community 
and Race Relations Strategy.” This document called for a number of things:
● a strong commitment from Operational Command Unit (OCU) Commanders to
the plan’s implementation and the passing on of CRR practice and structure to
their successors;
● key workers to inform the whole division of the strategy, ensuring that CRR
maintains a clear and consistent profile;
● extensive local consultation with the C-PCG on these issues through its Black
Issues Forum and any other similar groups;
● the development of a deeper and wider partnership among police and the 
C-PCG to deal with racial incidents;
● the participation of key personnel in the CRR Training Strategy and for the
incorporation of CRR strategy initiatives “into all stages of the probationer cycle
including Hendon, street duties and final confirmation”;
● the infusion of strategy issues into all aspects of divisional selection to “ensure
that Lambeth officers are encouraged to appreciate the importance and
seriousness of CRR issues”;
● research into the possibility of local positive action recruitment projects to
increase ethnic minority representation among officers in Lambeth;
● integrating CRR issues into the annual appraisal system of all significant ranks;
● the achievement of equality in service delivery;
● the development of incident response plans for major CRR incidents, making 
use of community mediators to inform police actions; and
● the establishment of a CRR information resource centre housed in the Borough
Liaison Office.
This document was self-consciously ambitious, designed not as a paper exercise but
as “a vehicle for lasting, positive, change in Lambeth.” In its Foreword, the three
local OCU commanders said that they felt their objectives were bold and 
confident, while also being achievable and realistic.
The PDL strategy in 1998
The PDL strategy at the time of the research was embodied in the Year One 
Action Plan adopted in the Autumn of 1997. While this document was not
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markedly different from the original, aspects of the strategy had been dropped.
Primary among these were efforts to address minority recruitment issues locally, and
the infusion of CRR issues into probationer selection and training processes. These
were arguably key components in any effort to make progress on CRR issues locally.
Recruiting officers who have an understanding of the importance of fair and
equitable policing, and training them from the outset in such a manner, is one of 
the main ingredients needed to create a police force that can live up to the ideals
promoted by the strategy. And, as will be discussed later, taking steps locally as well
as centrally to address minority recruitment could prove an important way of
ensuring that the under-representation of ethnic minorities in the police force will
be sufficiently addressed.
The Year One Action Plan itself also saw some slippage in implementation (see
Table 2 below). The reasons for this need examining. Since the Action Plan had
been drawn up, there had been substantial staff turnover at senior level – in the
Borough Liaison Office and amongst OCU commanders. The new senior
management team took the view that – whatever the practicability of the strategy 
at the time it was drawn up – new legislation and other operational developments
had created overwhelming pressure to reschedule the implementation timetable. In
particular, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 imposed a number of new 
requirements on the police and other local agencies:
● to establish new inter-agency partnerships for reducing crime and disorder;
● to develop fuller mechanisms for community consultation; and
● to restructure youth justice services.
Senior managers felt that they could only meet these requirements within the
specified deadlines if they adjusted the timescales of other commitments.
C-PCG respondents felt that the changes in the strategy were for the worse, and
argued that significant commitments had been watered down to a great extent. It
was thought that resource constraints and shifting priorities had resulted in “a
dilution and reduction of the effort.” As one put it, “PDL has become simply an internal
police training exercise.” Moreover, respondents tended to see the retrenchment as a
consequence of changes in senior staff, rather than of changes in the political and
legislative context. Responding to these concerns in a Policing Diversity Working
Group meeting, senior police managers argued that any perceived slowing of the
process was about “getting it right”, not changing its direction.
It is likely that there is some merit and validity to both perspectives, and we are
certainly not in a position to adjudicate between them. A difficulty for PDL,
THE PDL STRATEGY
17
however, is that C-PCG respondents saw the changes to the strategy’s
implementation as unilateral, not having been explained and justified by police
managers. The result was an erosion of their confidence in the strategy’s ability to
bring about change, which discouraged them from taking an active role in making
the strategy work and selling it to the public at large.
Progress on Year One objectives
We have assessed PDL’s progress against its success in achieving the objectives set
out in the Year One Action Plan. Table 2 provides a snapshot of progress achieved
by the middle of 1998. It divides the objectives into those which were concrete 
and short-term – whose attainment could be readily assessed – and the longer-term
ones which defined the programme’s aspirations.
Accomplished objectives
Several aspects of the strategy had already been accomplished by mid-1998.
Incorporating the strategy into the policing plan strikes us as an important step; 
and many of the other PDL achievements provided a better organisational
foundation on which to build further implementation. The working group 
mandated by Objective 2.1 had been established as the Policing Diversity Working
Group and was meeting on a regular basis. It comprised police personnel and
community representatives, and discussed and directed the progress of the strategy’s
implementation.
As proposed by Objective 1.5, PDL thinking had been incorporated into local
policing plans as well as the policing plan for the entire MPS. Objective 6.6 of the
1998-9 Brixton Division Policing Plan committed the police to “increase the
confidence and involvement of the local community in the way that Brixton is
policed.” Further, that document stressed the importance of achieving this 
objective by stating that “failure to deliver an effective service that is tailored to 
the diverse community of Brixton will hinder our ability to harness the support of
local people in reducing crime and disorder.” Such an inclusion meant that
components of PDL were now divisional objectives, and thus officers would be
assessed for their awareness of, and sensitivity to, these issues in addition to other
appraisal mechanisms.
At the time of fieldwork the CRR training regime was well underway. Senior 
officers had gone through the training and sergeants and other supervisors were
participating in training sessions throughout the summer months. A Vulnerable
Persons Unit had been established as proposed by the strategy and was fully
operational. Finally, several independent surveys of the community had been
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undertaken by the MPS in an attempt to stay in touch with public attitudes 
towards the police service and to inform the MPS’s efforts to make progress on
policing diversity issues.
Objectives not accomplished at the end of Year One
Many of the objectives falling into this category were being pursued by police but
could not yet be regarded as achieved. For instance, Objective 1.6 which seeks “to
widen and deepen understanding of police-CRR issues” among the police service
and general public had not been achieved. Understandably perhaps, those police
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Table 2: Progress on Year One objectives
1.5  Incorporate strategy into policing plan
2.1  Establish working group to develop strategy
action plans
2.2,2.4,8.3  Establish consultation mechanisms 
with core ethnic minority communities
5.1  Establish VPU
6.4  Incorporate CRR into staff appraisals
7.1  Develop CRR training strategy for all officers
in Lambeth
8.2  Undertake independent surveys of the
community
9 Youth strategy
10.1  Enhance the community’s awareness of the
PDL strategy
10.5  Ensure all police service personnel in
Lambeth are aware of the police service’s
commitment to internal and external fairness
and equality
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✘
✘
✘
✘
AccomplishedShort-term objectives Not yet fully
accomplished
1.6  Widen and deepen understanding of CRR issues
6.1, 6.2  Minority recruitment and support
8.1  Build the confidence and trust of all
communities in the Lambeth Police Service
8.4  Strive to achieve an equality of service delivery
✔
✔
✔
✔
Middle/long-term objectives Accomplished Work in progress
constables we interviewed lacked the sophisticated understanding of the issues
which we found amongst senior managers and community members of the C-PCG.
Furthermore, Objective 10.5, which sought to “ensure all police service personnel 
in Lambeth are aware of the police service’s commitment to internal and external
fairness and equality”, had not been accomplished. This is not to say that officers
did not understand that they have a duty to provide fair and equitable services; it is
to say that they remained unaware of the PDL policy explicitly committing the
police to improving the fairness of police practice.
With regard to the establishment of consultation mechanisms with the main 
ethnic minority communities in Lambeth and the development of new channels 
for positive interaction between police and public, both the Borough Liaison 
Office and the divisional commanders were keen to develop additional community
contacts in an effort to reach the community not represented by the Lambeth 
C-PCG, and were making efforts to do so. 
Progress had been very limited in relation to the objective of increasing minority
recruitment and support. Achieving this goal is obviously a long-term process: it 
will take significant attitudinal changes among youth towards the police, changes 
in police culture regarding the treatment of minority officers, and an improvement
in the qualifications of ethnic minorities, to see a significant enhancement of
minority representation in the police service. The officers we interviewed related
the hard time that officers from minority groups had within the force and the
difficulty they had in getting promotions. Unfortunately, as is discussed below, the
scope for tackling such issues unilaterally at OCU level is limited.
With regard to the youth strategy, community leaders suggested that more needed
to be done in this area. Several thought that positive interaction with youth should
be an ongoing practice that involves more officers on a more regular basis. Given
the importance of this to the development of greater community support and co-
operation, as well as its importance in the effort to make the police service
something that more young people will consider joining, the police should not
down-play or underestimate the need to remain committed in this sphere.
Objectives 8.1, 8.4 and 10.1, which dealt with community perceptions and
experiences, are discussed below.
Police perspectives on PDL
Police managers were clearly committed to the PDL strategy and were engaged in
active efforts to implement it. In a number of fora, divisional commanders had
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expressed their understanding of the importance of making the strategy work and
their determination to see it achieved. This was important as it meant that
subordinates could take cues from their leadership that these issues were important,
forming an integral part of the police organisational landscape. 
By the time of fieldwork the original signatories of the PDL plan had moved on,
leaving their successors to implement it. The rapid turnover of senior police staff
created difficulties for PDL. Inevitably, the new senior management team had their
own perspective on the strategy, which was at some points at odds with that of 
their predecessors. Implementing the substantial provisions of the Crime and
Disorder Act 1998 provided an added complication. The net effect was that from
the point of view of C-PCG members, negotiated agreements and shared
understandings had withered away. This undoubtedly set back progress in
implementing PDL substantially.
Police respondents identified a related but slightly different problem in the policy 
of transferring all constables once they have served eight years in one division.
Several officers commented on the loss of experience and local knowledge, and the
damage to community relations, that such moves could sometimes entail. For
example, one permanent beat officer (PBO) reaching the eight-year threshold
explained that he had only now come to understand the many different facets of 
the local community he policed. The transfer policy was designed to limit
inefficiencies and the opportunities for corruption that can occur when officers 
have become very well-established in an area. Assessing the policy clearly lies well
outside the remit of this report. We appreciate that introducing some flexibility to
allow for exceptional cases could prove impractical. If there is no scope for 
flexibility in such cases, clearly it is of particular importance to ensure proper
transitional hand-over arrangements in cases where an officer has a special
relationship with the community.
Officer awareness and perceptions of the PDL strategy
All interviewed sergeants and constables were asked about their awareness of PDL.
Out of the fourteen officers interviewed, four were sergeants who had been through
the CRR training8 and thus were roughly familiar with the strategy; five – all
constables – equated PDL with the CRR training course, and five said that they 
had heard nothing about it. Some of those who equated PDL with CRR training 
saw its potential, whilst others expressed ambivalence: 
“The training is a good thing.”
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8 At the time of fieldwork only
sergeants and above had had
access to the CRR training
programme.
“It is trying to get cops to understand and communicate with the various
cultures in the area”; “deals mainly with Black and White issues”; 
“anything is better than nothing.” 
“I don’t understand its objectives and potential benefits. We’ve had these
things in the past and our preconceptions will get in the way of learning.”
“Officers were frightened of it. . . seen as another political thing.”
“I wonder if it will help. . .most [officers] feel things won’t change.”
The biggest anxiety seemed to be that it would point the finger at them and charge
them with being racist. It will be a challenge to overcome negative preconceptions
of the training and achieve any significant impact on officer thinking.
The fact that several officers were completely unfamiliar with the strategy or the
training pointed to the need for managers to communicate more effectively to 
front-line officers about PDL.
Officers’ experience of the CRR training
Feedback from officers who had been through the CRR training was mostly 
positive. In discussing issues relevant to the PDL strategy, such as the impact of
ethnic diversity on policing, these officers demonstrated an appreciation of its
impact and the importance of being able to understand and constructively
communicate with persons from other backgrounds. 
Community perspectives on PDL
An integral part of judging the PDL strategy and its impact involves the 
community. This section presents the perspectives of C-PCG members and of the
general public. 
Public awareness of PDL strategy
C-PCG members were obviously well aware of the strategy, as several of them had
participated in its development. All were familiar with the strategy’s various
components and had a clear idea of what the strategy was trying to accomplish.
However, many expressed doubt as to its ability to bring about change in actual
police practices. As one put it, “Any commitment to change personal behaviour of an
individual takes an enormous amount of commitment and willpower. Multiply that by
30,000 and that is how difficult it is to change this organisation. . . Policy ain’t gonna cut
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it.” The general attitude seemed to be that it was early in the life of the strategy 
and they would have to wait and see if it had an impact on police activity on the
ground. Unsurprisingly perhaps, those members of the general public whom we
interviewed were completely unaware of the existence of the strategy or any effort
on the part of the police to improve the fairness and equity of their interactions 
with the community.
Despite the fact that the PDL plan, according to the minutes of the Policing
Diversity Working Group, was distributed widely to several agencies including
schools and youth centres, there was little awareness of the strategy’s existence at
the end of its first year. Such a failure to communicate in this regard — on the part
of both the police and C-PCG – hindered progress on these issues, leaving the
public to feel that no action of any sort was being taken to address their concerns.
Neither C-PCG respondents nor others had yet sensed any change in police
practices. While acknowledging that police managers were engaged in efforts to
implement the PDL strategy, C-PCG members expressed doubt that it was having
any impact on the ground yet. Two quotes illustrate this: 
“I don’t know if there has been a shift at the front line. . . There is a pull
between what happens on the 2nd floor [i.e. senior management] and the
ground floor.” 
“There are lots of equality policies, very little equality on the ground.”
Views about the implementation of PDL
The dominant view about PDL’s implementation was that it had been damaged by
the revisions to the implementation timetable. It was thought that this had had the
effect of scaling back PDL from its original conception. There was a widely
expressed view that senior police were not as committed to the PDL strategy as
would be required for it to be a success. We cannot assess to what extent this was
true. Clearly, however, the Borough Liaison Office had served as a “lightning
conductor” for C-PCG concerns about PDL; a wide range of criticisms of police 
staff were made to us with great intensity of feeling. Whatever else may have
happened, there had clearly been a breakdown in communication about the reasons
why PDL had not been implemented as originally planned. 
The role of the Lambeth Community-Police Consultative Group in PDL
As with many community organisations, the C-PCG makes significant demands of
time and energy on its membership. The voluntary nature of the Group’s
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membership and the constraints on their time combine to limit what can be asked
and expected of the people who sit on the C-PCG and its various committees. Not
surprisingly, those we spoke to – including members of the C-PCG itself – had 
fairly ambivalent views about the Group and its achievements.
On the positive side, many thought that the C-PCG had been pivotal in getting 
the PDL strategy off the ground. As one said, “Nothing would be happening without 
the C-PCG. Their pressure has been key.” It was also thought that the Group had
played an important part in getting the MPS to take steps to address public 
concerns over deaths in custody and the use of CS spray. It was put to us that these
achievements were all the more remarkable in view of the lack of any direct 
controls over police decision-making.
Indeed some respondents argued that the C-PCG tended to be judged against
unrealistic criteria. Properly viewed for what it is – a forum for police and
community communications – they thought that it had been quite effective and 
had provided the opportunity for some degree of scrutiny and accountability.
Regardless of their views on its achievements, C-PCG respondents did not regard
the group as an adequate substitute for democratically elected control and authority
over police. They argued that it should not be the only vehicle for consultation
locally and that police accountability structures need to be strengthened. Many put
their hopes in the new Police Authority and the forthcoming elected London
Assembly.
On the negative side, some scepticism was expressed about the Group’s
representativeness. On the one hand there was the suggestion that its day-to-day
operation was in the hands of white, middle-aged members. On the other, some
thought that geographically it was “Brixton dominated” and, in terms of issues, “race
has been the number one agenda item at the C-PCG.” Both C-PCG respondents and
the police acknowledged that it represented some interests and perspectives much
more effectively than others. 
Many commented on the highly politicised nature of the group, and on the
tendency for this politicisation to compromise its effectiveness. Both police and 
C-PCG members had strong feelings in this regard:
“These are people playing politics, trying to get somewhere.” Police officer
“C-PCG meetings are hijacked by activists.” C-PCG member
“They cause a lot of noise and hot air, but are unrepresentative.” Police
officer
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“Meetings are political theatre, not consultation.” C-PCG member
Indeed, it would be hard to ignore the highly politically charged nature of debate
about policing in Lambeth. It was clear that there were distinct factions at
community level espousing sharply conflicting perspectives on policing issues. 
Given this, a wide range of issues considered by the Group tended to become
politicised and racialised. Several respondents commented on the significant
personal animosities within the Group, and the considerable distrust and mutual
scepticism. In this context, the police were constantly defensive and the vocal
community continually combative. This frustrated partnership efforts, confounded
efforts to understand differing perspectives, and prevented an appreciation of any
positive things that did take place. The most pessimistic views expressed were that
the Group served as nothing more than “a soap box for pet concerns,” and was 
simply a “talking shop” with few accomplishments.
One theme which emerged in interviews with both police and C-PCG members 
was that the Group was open to criticism for failing to put the same fervour into
challenging crime and criminals within the community as they did into challenging
police practice. The view was expressed that in adopting an adversarial or even
antagonistic stance towards the police, C-PCG members were at risk of ignoring 
the culpability of police suspects.
Chapter summary
The main points to have emerged in this assessment of PDL’s first year are:
● implementation of the strategy had been subject to some slippage.
● this had damaged relations between the C-PCG and the police; some C-PCG
members saw the slippage as a sign of reduction in police commitment to the
strategy.
● some of the strategy’s Year One objectives had been met, but others had not.
● in particular, rank-and-file police awareness of PDL was low, and community
awareness very limited indeed.
● the C-PCG had played a key part in initiating PDL, but the effectiveness of the
group in promoting the strategy was limited, and constrained by in-fighting
between individuals in different organisations.
This stock-taking exercise has exposed some of the pitfalls which threaten any
attempt to improve relations between the police and the community. First, and
unsurprisingly, progress is often slow – slower than key participants would wish.
Secondly, the natural impatience to see progress puts pressure particularly on police
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participants to take an optimistic view of what can be achieved within what time-
frames: people are tempted to offer hostages to fortune in such circumstances.
Thirdly, optimistic plans can very readily be derailed by unexpected factors,
including new legislative demands and new management priorities. Finally, if and
when this occurs, a dynamic is triggered in which previously established trust is
rapidly eroded. Even the most adept of communicators may find it difficult to
retrieve such a situation.
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4.  Conclusions and recommendations
This chapter aims to pull together the conclusions which can be drawn from our
preliminary evaluation of Policing Diversity in Lambeth. We examined the PDL
strategy at the end of its first year of life. It would obviously be premature to 
attempt conclusive statements about the impact of the strategy on policing. Since
we carried out the fieldwork the strategy has continued to evolve. It is important to
continue monitoring developments when more of its components have been fully
put into practice. What can be judged at the end of Year One, though, is whether
the strategy is capable of adequately addressing local problems and whether the
police and community are doing what is necessary to bring about long-term 
positive improvements. First we offer our view of the strengths and weaknesses of
the strategy, and then we offer some more specific suggestions for the future of
strategies of this sort.
Quality of the strategy 
PDL’s formal objectives, as stated in its Year One Action Plan, were:
● to ensure that no member of the Lambeth public is treated in a discriminatory
way on the grounds of sex, colour, race, sexual orientation, religion or disability;
● to ensure that all officers operating in Lambeth comply with these principles; 
and
● to enhance police/community relations in our area and thereby help reduce
crime, assist in bringing offenders to justice, and promote the quality and safety 
of life in our community.
The strategy had several strengths. First, it promoted the development of a broad
spectrum of community contacts. Second, it placed substantial priority on CRR
training as a mechanism for educating police officers on community race relations.
Third, it promoted the recruitment and support of ethnic minorities in the police
force. Fourth, PDL objectives were incorporated into policing plans and the staff
appraisal process. Finally, the importance of improving links and relations with 
youth in the community was made evident by the commitment in the strategy to
engage in a number of efforts involving youth and schools. Each of these
components were valuable parts of the process of bringing the police closer to
delivering a service that is fair and equitable and seen to be so. The strategy should
thus be viewed as a good starting point, for it initiated a process focused upon CRR
issues and developed some mechanisms for improving the way the police interact
with the public. However, in the state of development that it had reached in mid-
1998, several aspects of the strategy needed addressing.
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Organisational “sticks and carrots”
Arguably the weakest link of the Year One Action Plan was its failure to specify in
any detail mechanisms to “ensure that all officers operating in Lambeth comply 
with these principles.” Whilst the priority given to CRR training was in itself
desirable, it should not in our view have been regarded as the primary means of
effecting change in officer behaviour. We do not doubt the value of CRR training.
By itself, however, it is unlikely to bring about a significant change in police 
practice. 
Training initiatives and management controls have only a limited ability to impact
on police working practices. Police working culture does not evolve by accident, 
but is a response to the day-to-day pressures and demands of police work. Policing
routinely involves physical risks; it routinely involves the management of conflict,
and challenges to personal authority, and can be highly stressful; it constantly
exposes staff to the least attractive facets of human behaviour. It is hardly surprising
that researchers in developed countries9 across the world have identified a
consistent occupational culture characterised by:
● intense solidarity and mutual support at working level;
● a heavy emphasis on the maintenance of police authority on the streets; 
● scepticism about senior managers and their initiatives;
● cynicism about people’s motives and behaviour;
● a tendency towards simplification in thinking about crime problems and the
police function;
● an accompanying stress on crime-fighting goals; and
● a pragmatism about ends justifying means.
Without effective oversight, this occupational culture can lead to serious problems
in police/community relations even in culturally homogeneous areas. In culturally
diverse areas with high crime, it can have seriously perverse effects. It can lead to
the development and maintenance of practices which bear disproportionately on
minority groups – without there necessarily being racist intent on the part of any
individuals. 
For strategies such as PDL to get properly established, therefore, a comprehensive
system of organisational “sticks and carrots” needs to be put in place to counteract
the possible effects of occupational culture. These might include:
● making the complaints process more responsive to incidents in which racism or
bias is at issue; 
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review which argues the need for
a more intelligent understanding
of the “canteen culture” and its
relationship to police practice.
● providing more support for police officers and members of the public who report
and sanction improper behaviour of officers;
● ensuring that formal and informal performance indicators do not encourage
patrol officers to over-use stop-and-search tactics;
● removing institutional rewards from those who substitute quantity for quality in
their stop-and-search or arrest tactics;
● rewarding officers for pursuing PDL objectives;
● withholding rewards from those whose appraisals reveal indifference to PDL
objectives; or
● signalling that a successful tour of duty in a challenging borough is a stepping
stone to rapid promotion. 
Some officers suggested that a compounding factor undermining policy initiatives
such as PDL was the sheer rapidity of policy development and frequency of new
initiatives within the MPS. It was suggested that PCs get overwhelmed and 
confused with the level of change, meaning that new policies like PDL get lost in
the shuffle. The chances of implementing strategies like PDL successfully are much
reduced if they are competing for the workforce’s attention with other innovations. 
Communication 
Our findings point to a need for a coherent, organised, and effective
communications strategy within initiatives such as PDL. We have argued that poor
communication and mutual misunderstanding lies at the heart of poor
police/community relations. Strategies such as PDL need to give attention both to
internal communication within the police and to communication between the 
police and community.
Improving internal communication is more difficult than it might appear at first
sight. Attempts had been made to explain PDL to officers on the ground, but these
had met with limited success. We suspect that part of the problem lies in the way
that day-to-day pressures of police work insulate patrol officers from their senior
managers. An effective internal communication strategy may have to stress that
pursuing PDL is in officers’ own interests. There are two types of “selling point”: 
the first is that improving relations between the police and the community will 
make the police job easier, safer and more rewarding; the second is that doing so 
will unlock organisational rewards (or ward off organisational punishments).
Improving external communications is more challenging. The problem is that 
when police/community relations are poor, whatever the police say will be 
weakened by their low credibility. The establishment of a CRR Information
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Resource Centre as proposed in the Year One Action Plan may provide a means of
facilitating greater public awareness of police efforts. Any strategy for improving
external communications will require the police to co-opt “allies” who have greater
credibility than themselves with relevant sections of the community.
The C-PCG clearly has an important role to play in communicating the PDL
strategy and its achievements to the wider community. We recognise that there are
limits to what can be expected of busy people working in a voluntary capacity.
However, C-PCG members are currently better placed than the police to convey to
some sectors of the community what PDL is, and what it is trying to achieve.
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 created a new role for the local authority in
tackling crime, which explicitly embraces community consultation. In developing a
crime reduction strategy with the police and other partners, the local authority has
to consult extensively, and is expected to convey to the public the nature of the
resultant strategy. The responsibility which the local authority shares with the 
police to audit crime problems – and to take account of the public’s view of crime
problems – provides a significant new opportunity to educate and inform the
community about the nature of crime and the steps which are taken to tackle it.
Initiatives such as PDL properly fall under the umbrella of local crime partnerships’
crime reduction strategies, and need to be integrated with these.
Recruitment
Both police and community respondents cited various factors as working against
minority recruitment:
● real and perceived racism within the police force;
● youth perceptions of police;
● peer influence against joining the police; and
● a limited pool of qualified ethnic minority applicants.
Clearly the problem is not amenable to a “quick fix”. It is one that is endemic to
British policing. There is a need for sustained long-term action both at force level
and at OCU/borough level. Little progress had been made in implementing the
recruitment elements of the PDL strategy, because there was a lack of clarity about
the division of labour between central personnel services and staff in OCUs – and
indeed a lack of agreement about whether there was any role at all for local action. 
Action can be taken locally to address ethnic minority recruitment. One example is
the scheme in Tottenham called “Equal Opportunities in Action” which offers 10
weeks of pre-entry training to help potential candidates meet the required 
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standards for sitting the police entrance tests. Clearly, there are many steps in the
process to increase recruitment of ethnic minority officers. Youths from minority
groups who are in the pool of potential future recruits need to have positive
experiences of, and interactions with, the police. Those who eventually join need 
to have rewarding careers and access to promotion. This in turn will encourage
others to contemplate a police career. Making these processes a reality requires
action at OCU level as much as at force level.
Action is also being taken to address ethnic minority recruitment at a national 
level. In July 1999, the Home Secretary announced employment targets for the
police, prison, fire and probation services and for the Home Office. Targets have
been set for each police force, and they are intended to go some way towards
ensuring that local public services are truly representative of their communities, 
and consequently able to serve them better.
Stop-and-search
Stop-and-search is one of the major sources of public concern, and real
improvement in this area would do much to improve relations between the police
and the public. As found in this study, it appears that the interaction between police
and stopped individuals often leads to an escalation of stop situations. Thus, in
addition to getting officers to learn how to communicate and interact better with
persons from ethnic minority groups through the CRR training, members of the
public, especially youths, should be trained on how to interact with police so as not
to escalate the situation when they are stopped. This is done at present by groups
such as the 1990 Trust, but more effort needs to be put into ensuring that such
training reaches as many persons as possible.
Beyond the issue of interaction during stops, there are particularly difficult 
questions about acceptable rates of stop-and-search. First of all, a view needs to be
taken about overall acceptability of “hit rates”. What proportion of stops should
yield an arrest - or a conviction? Each time that the suspicions leading to a stop 
turn out to be unfounded, there are costs, in the shape of damage to
police/community relations. A high level of unproductive stops will carry a high
cost, and at some level this cost will outweigh the benefits gained from successful
stops. It is a matter of fine judgement when this level is exceeded. 
An even more difficult question concerns the disproportionate rate of stops for
ethnic minorities. The community needs to recognise the possibility, if not
probability, that some sectors of some minority groups may be disproportionately
involved in some sorts of crime. Equally, the police need to recognise that policing
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methods premised on such beliefs may well produce biased “evidence” about
minority involvement in crime and lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. National and
MPS statistics indicate that black people are five times more likely to be stopped
and searched than white, and that the tactic is particularly heavily used in 
London.10 This is compelling prima facie evidence that the tactic is being used in a
way which bears disproportionately and without full justification on black people.
The statistics need fuller examination, however; in particular, rates of persons
stopped and searched per thousand population need to be compared with rates of
stop-and-searches themselves. 
A related issue concerns special operations mounted by officers unfamiliar with an
area. Police respondents suggested that, when poorly executed, these tended to
inflame local concerns about the police without achieving any significant success.
The problem was seen to lie in officers’ ignorance of local issues and local
personalities. One way of minimising risks of damage to community relations is to
ensure that there is better and fuller consultation with local permanent beat 
officers and, where appropriate, members of the public. 
Recommendations
When this study was completed in mid-1998, we offered police managers in
Lambeth a series of recommendations about the development of PDL. For the
purposes of this report, we have translated the recommendations into general
principles which we think will apply to any CRR strategy designed to improve
relations between police and public.
● CRR strategies must be firmly embedded within police forces’ organisational
reward systems, with a comprehensive mix of “sticks and carrots” designed to
ensure that officers take the strategies seriously.
● CRR training is of obvious value, but cannot be relied upon as the only or
primary means of changing officers’ behaviour and beliefs. Equating CRR
strategies solely with CRR training is a recipe for failure.
● CRR strategies need a well-designed internal communications plan. Such
strategies will need “selling” to officers on the ground. The payoffs in terms of
effectiveness, safety and organisational rewards will need spelling out.
● To aid internal communication, local senior managers need to signal loudly and
clearly to their workforce that they attach importance to the CRR strategy.
● CRR strategies need comprehensive plans for external communication. It is
essential to get across to the community the nature of crime problems, and the
ways in which the police and their partners are tackling crime. 
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reliable in forces other than the
MPS (cf FitzGerald and Hale,
forthcoming). 
● The police themselves may lack sufficient credibility to get the message across to
those who most need to hear it. “Allies” may be needed, such as the C-PCG in
Lambeth, who can command more trust in relevant sectors of the community.
● Local crime reduction partnerships established by the Crime and Disorder Act
1998 need to be fully involved in CRR strategies. 
● The impact of formal and informal performance indicators needs to be carefully
assessed, to ensure that they do not distort policing practice in ways which
damage community relations. This is especially important in relation to stop-
and-search practice.
● CRR strategies should place emphasis on the early identification of sources of
concern within the community about policing practice; sources of concern need
to be acknowledged and debated openly by the police. 
● CRR strategies need to find ways of educating and training people – and
especially youths – from ethnic minority groups about policing practice and ways
of interacting successfully with the police.
● CRR strategies need to foster a more explicit debate about appropriate levels of
stop-and-search and about acceptable “hit rates” in terms of arrests. 
● Where special operations involving high rates of stop-and-search (or other such
tactics) are used, there needs to be closer consultation with local permanent 
beat officers and, where appropriate, members of the public.
● CRR strategies need to assess fully the scope for effective local action to 
stimulate ethnic minority recruitment.
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5.  Epilogue
This study assessed the Policing Diversity in Lambeth (PDL) strategy at the end of
its first year, in mid-1998. Since then, the MPS has experienced rapid change on a
number of fronts. Crucially, the report of the Macpherson Inquiry into the murder 
of Stephen Lawrence has transformed debate about police/community relations, 
and in particular about relations between the police and ethnic minority groups.
The Home Secretary’s priorities for policing in 1999 emphasised the need for
improved community relations. The follow-up report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate
of Constabulary, “Winning the Race Revisited”, further stressed the need for urgent
action (HMIC, 1999). Parallel with these developments, the 1998 Crime and
Disorder Act imposed a duty on police and local authorities to work to reduce 
crime in partnership with local communities, and to engage more fully in
consultation with local communities.
Together these developments have created a significant impetus for change. While
some negative reactions may be expected in the short-term post-Macpherson, there
seems to be a real determination by the MPS to see real improvements. One senses
that major cultural change could be starting to occur within the police service. 
As befits a borough with its demographic profile and its recent history, Lambeth
secured a head-start over many other London boroughs in developing a strategy to
improve police/community relations. PDL was getting established well before the
Macpherson Inquiry presented its findings. This report has offered a snapshot of
progress achieved - and pitfalls encountered - in Year One of the strategy’s life. We
have probably focused more on pitfalls than progress, simply because one learns
more from mistakes rather than successes. Thus it is only fair to the C-PCG and to
the Lambeth police borough to end this report with a summary of progress in PDL
since mid-1998. The following account depends very largely on what we have been
told by the police and C-PCG well after fieldwork on the project was completed.
The PDL initiative has served as a valuable pilot for work in other boroughs within
the MPS. The CRR training has been rolled out successfully, and almost all serving
officers and civilian staff in Lambeth have now been through the programme. Staff
moving to the borough have a much improved induction process. Comprehensive
briefing packages have been prepared for both police and civilian staff about the
nature of institutional racism.
Policing in Lambeth has also seen some structural changes which will support PDL
objectives. As elsewhere in the MPS, borough-based policing has been introduced,
whereby there is a single operational command unit for each borough, rather than
the previous two or three divisions. The borough’s crime reduction strategy has 
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been agreed and published. The community policing system has been reorganised, 
to provide increased support for community-led problem-oriented policing. Three
Community Safety Units have been established to support this process. Lambeth 
has served as a pilot site for improving stop-and-search procedures.
It is early days to say whether these initiatives are paying off, but there is room for
some optimism. A clue to the effectiveness of the Policing Diversity initiative may
be found in the nature of the response to the nail-bomb attack which took place in
Brixton in April 1999. After this incident the police and members of the 
community worked well together not only to help the immediate investigation but
also to minimise the potentially divisive impact of the bombing. Indeed the local
response seems to have strengthened the Brixton community. Of course we cannot
say for certain, but we are doubtful whether a similar situation would have received
a similarly positive response a few years ago.
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